Abstract -This paper investigates breaks in the variability and comovement of output, consumption, and investment in the G-7 economies. In contrast with most other papers on comovement, we test for changes in comovement, allowing for breaks in mean and variance. Despite claims that rising integration among these economies has increased output correlations among them, we find no clear evidence of an increase in correlation of growth rates of output, consumption, or investment. This finding is true even for the United States and Canada, which have seen a tremendous increase in bilateral trade shares, and for the euro-area members of the G-7.
I. Introduction
M UCH recent research has focused on changes in the business-cycle properties of economic activity in industrialized economies. It is now common wisdom that the standard deviation of U.S. economic growth fell by onethird or more in the mid-1980s. 1 As Doyle and Faust (2002) and many others have noted, growth abroad also seems to have stabilized. 2 The source of the drop in variance is still unresolved. One important branch of research now focuses on whether cross-country linkages in growth have also shifted, perhaps in a way that can help rationalize the variance reduction.
Economic integration has increased markedly since the 1970s, leading some observers to argue that economic growth will be more highly correlated. Speculation on this topic peaked with the nearly simultaneous slowing of growth in the G-7 3 and other economies at the beginning of 2001. Discussions of the possibility of a new era of more synchronized growth appeared in major news outlets and policy publications. 4 The continued progress toward economic integration in Europe, highlighted by monetary union in 1999, has further fueled these discussions-the major question being whether the euro area is becoming more nearly an optimal currency area.
Changes in the standard deviation and correlation of growth are related, of course. Simply by definition, with all else constant, a fall by 1/3 in the U.S. standard deviation implies a 50% increase in the correlation of the United States with every other country. All else was not constant, however. If the growth variation that disappeared in the United States and abroad was idiosyncratic, then correlation should have risen. If the growth variation that disappeared was common, then covariance and correlation should have fallen. Thus, summarizing developments in growth variability and covariance could help shed light on the source of the changes.
This paper summarizes the changes in the variability of and comovement among growth rates of G-7 countries. Various analyses suggest that the G-7 can interestingly be broken into three groups: Japan; the euro countries; and Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which we refer to as the English countries. 5 Of course, Japan behaved very differently than the other six countries in the 1990s. We set Japan aside for most of the analysis and focus on the G-7 less Japan and the euro and English subgroups.
Our analysis differs from many others in two ways. Like some earlier work, we consider consumption and investment growth as well as GDP growth. This consideration potentially allows us to distinguish among some theories of the source of changes. What is most unique about our paper, however, is that we focus on formal tests for changes in various measures of comovement. Up to now, there has been much work testing for breaks in variance, but the work on comovement has almost exclusively described changes, without formal tests of significance. 6 We consider data from 1960 to the end of 2002 and focus mainly on a three-break case, where the breaks are found to fall in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Thus, the four regimes correspond roughly to the decades, and we talk about them in that way. Our main conclusions are these:
1. Growth volatility perhaps rose between the 1960s and the 1970s, but fell as time passed between any other pair of periods. In particular, for consumption, output, and investment, there is generally consistent and strong evidence of a fall in volatility between any two periods spanning the early 1980s break. 2. The evidence on changes in comovement is far less clear. Point estimates of correlation generally rose between the 1960s and all subsequent periods, and for several country pairs or subgroups these changes are statistically significant. In contrast, after the 1960s, the point estimates of the changes are mixed and there are very few statistically significant changes. Especially for consumption and GDP growth, however, a majority of the point estimates indicate a decline in correlation. 3. The general results on comovement also hold for the United States and Canada and for the euro and English groups. Thus, after the 1960s, the point estimates of correlation generally indicate a decline in correlation within these groups; few of these are statistically significant.
We note two details regarding the final claim. First, we find virtually no statistically significant evidence of an increase in consumption growth correlation, which is sometimes assumed to be reflective of better risk sharing. Second, the fact that U.S.-Canada correlation has not increased is particularly notable given the sizable increase in trade after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1989. Section II provides some background; section III gives some descriptive evidence illustrating our major points. Section IV provides the formal inference; section V has some robustness checks; section VI concludes.
II. Background on Comovement of Growth
Output growth correlation is moderately positive on average across the G-7. This section presents some background that may help interpret both this positive correlation and changes it may have undergone.
A. A Simple Framework
We start with a very simple exercise to illustrate the accounting relations among variance, covariance, and correlation. Home (h) and foreign ( f ) growth are driven by common shocks, ε c , that directly affect both countries, and by idiosyncratic shocks, ε h and ε f , that directly affect only one country. Writing growth as y, we have y h ϭ ε h ϩ ε c ϩ ␥y f , y f ϭ ε f ϩ ε c ϩ ␥y h .
For simplicity, the countries are treated symmetrically. We include the foreign country's growth in the equation determining home-country growth to summarize how linkages may transfer idiosyncratic shocks across borders. We focus on the case where 0 Ͻ ␥ Ͻ 1, with each idiosyncratic shock having a variance x 2 and with the common shock having a variance c 2 . The following facts are straightforward to confirm. The existence of common shocks and the cross-border effects of idiosyncratic shocks imply that the growth rates will be positively correlated. A decrease in the variance of the common shock ( c 2 ) will decrease the variance in each economy as well as decrease the covariance. Because covariance decreases proportionally more than variance, correlation also falls. Thus, if we explain a decrease in variance by a lower variance of common shocks, in this framework we would also see both lower covariance and lower correlation.
A fall in the variance of both countries' idiosyncratic shocks reduces the variance of each economy and again reduces covariance through spillovers. In this case, however, growth correlation rises. Intuitively, correlation is the share of variation that is common. The fall in idiosyncratic variation reduces the total variation but increases the share that is common.
Finally, making linkages stronger through increasing ␥, holding x 2 and c 2 constant, raises variance, covariance, and correlation. Thus, a fall in the variance of either country in this case must be due to a smaller ␥ and will have an associated fall in covariance and correlation. The proponents of the view that rising economic integration has increased correlation have a richer set of channels in mind. We provide a brief review of the arguments and evidence regarding linkages and comovement.
B. Some Evidence on Increased Economic Linkages
There have been substantial increases in trade and financial linkages among the G-7 countries in the last several decades. Each G-7 country, except Japan, has shown an increase in its merchandise trade share (exports plus imports divided by GDP) with its G-7 partners over the period since 1960 (figure 1). As a percentage of its own GDP, Canada's trade with its G-7 partners almost tripled from just over 20% to more than 60%, with much of the rise coming after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1989. 7 The U.S. share rose from approximately 3% to approximately 9% over the period, and shares for each of the European G-7 nations have about doubled, reaching about 20%.
Watson (forthcoming) include one test that arguably sheds some light on the emergence of a higher comovement among euro countries.
Financial integration has also increased. For example, the share of foreign equities in U.S. equity portfolios rose from less than 2% in the early 1980s to almost 12% in 2001 (figure 2). The share of U.S. equities in foreign equity portfolios also rose markedly over the period. Other measures of international financial market integration show a similar pattern of increase. 8
C. The Relationship between Integration and Comovement
Even in the simplest cases, theory makes remarkably few predictions about the relation between integration and comovement. The easiest case to analyze is that of two economies moving from partial integration to a completely integrated, fully efficient equilibrium. When economies are completely integrated, intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are, by definition, equalized. With additional strong assumptions such as a single good, log utility, and purchasingpower parity, complete integration implies that consumption growth will be perfectly correlated. Thus, the increase in integration raises consumption correlation. Weakening any of the assumptions can overturn this result. If we move to greater, but still incomplete, integration, consumption correlation may increase or decrease. Further, the fact that consumption is an aggregate of many types of items, including durables, is problematic. There seems to be a presumption, however, that consumption correlation would increase across countries with increased integration.
As for output and investment, even when moving to fully efficient integration, factors are working to increase and to decrease correlation. Under autarky, output and investment decisions are intimately linked with consumption smoothing. With integration, the trade and asset flows that facilitate complete consumption insurance allow output and investment decisions in the individual economies to be substantially delinked from current consumption decisions. Thus, for example, a country experiencing a positive countryspecific productivity shock can borrow from abroad-immediately raising consumption and investment by more than would be efficient under autarky. This borrowing can magnify the effect of the differential productivity shocks, decreasing output and investment correlations. Whether inte-gration raises or lowers correlation through this channel can depend on whether there is horizontal or vertical integration of production (Kose & Yi, 2001 , 2002 .
If the model allows a role for demand shocks, then increased integration can increase output, consumption, and investment correlations, as demand shocks in one country fall partly on imported goods and are thereby transmitted to others. Even this effect is ambiguous, however. The standard Mundell-Fleming model generates a negative output correlation in response to monetary policy shocks, as the associated exchange rate movement leads agents to substitute between home and foreign goods. Kollmann (2001) shows that in a New Keynesian open economy model one can generate positive output correlation in response to both productivity and monetary shocks. 9 Some longer-term implications of integration may lower correlation. For example, integration may lead to specialization of production along the lines of comparative advantage. If there are asymmetric shocks by specialty, output and investment correlation can once again decrease under greater integration. 10 A common intuition is that financial integration will raise correlations, but Heathcote and Perri (2002) show that financial autarky can generate higher output correlations through terms-of-trade effects. 11 Finally, at least since Mundell (1963) it has been clear that the way integration affects the transmission of shocks may differ with the nature and coordination of the monetary policy regimes in place. Our sample period saw the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangement, a period of adjustment to flexible exchange rates in the face of oil shocks, a later convergence on policies heavily focused on stabilizing inflation, and the creation of the euro. One muchdiscussed hypothesis for the fall in volatility is improved monetary policy. As Ahmed et al. (2004) note, if there has been a general convergence on better countercyclical policy, we might expect to see lower volatility and lower comovement primarily at business cycle frequencies.
In principle, one could build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to sort out the relative magnitudes of these various effects, and there has been much progress in this regard, as evidenced by some of the articles cited above. There is reason to doubt, however, whether we have yet specified these models with sufficient detail to resolve the empirical issue. DSGE models with flexible prices and complete markets have difficulty generating anything close to the positive output correlation found in the data. 12 As just noted, sticky prices and a role for demand shocks do not necessarily fix this problem.
Although theory does not resolve whether stronger links increase comovement, empirical studies suggest that in the limit, at least, integration raises output correlation. Growth correlations of regions within a country are generally higher than the correlations of similarly situated regions across national boundaries. Because trade and financial links are usually higher within than between countries, these studies suggest that, at least in the limit as national boundaries are erased, more integration raises correlation. 13 Of course, the G-7 has not become fully integrated. We know of no clear evidence that increased integration of the magnitude that we have observed should significantly raise the correlation among G-7 economies. 14 In light of this prior work, the goal of the remainder of the paper is to document any changes that have occurred.
III. Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we present a graphical summary of changes in the variability and comovement of G-7 growth. 15 Figure 3 shows the four-quarter GDP growth rates of the G-7 economies and a simple average of the growth rates in two subregions-the English group and the euro group. U.S. recessions are shaded. Japan and the euro economies both seem to have a slight downward trend in their growth rates. One can also see the overall positive correlation, with the movements being most similar around the time of U.S. recessions. It is also possible to see the much-discussed decline in the standard-deviation growth in the United States and elsewhere. Figure 4 summarizes changes in the standard deviation of growth in the G-7. Each point on the figure shows the sample standard deviation of quarterly growth measured over the previous 5 years (20 quarters). The standard deviation for the English and euro panels is a simple average of growth rates in the subgroup.
The decline of the standard deviation for the United States (dashed) is dramatic, falling by more than 1/3 in a 9 Whether he matches the data depends on his assumptions about the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. The positive correlation in the case of a home positive money shock arises not only because of increased home demand for foreign goods, but also because home depreciation raises real money balances abroad.
10 Krugman (1993) develops this argument. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2001) show that U.S. states and OECD countries with a more specialized production structure have output that is less correlated with other states or countries. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2003) provide evidence that more risk sharing leads to greater industrial specialization both across regions and across countries.
11 For other examples of ambiguous effects related to increased capital mobility, see Frankel (1988) . 12 See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) and the survey by Baxter (1995) . 13 This result seems to hold when controlling for such as factors as size of the economies, distance between the areas compared, and policy differences. See, for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Clark and van Wincoop (2001) .
14 Most estimates of the effect of small increases in trade intensity on output correlation are similarly small. See Canova and Dellas (1993) , Frankel and Rose (1998) , Anderson, Kwark, and Vahid (1999) , Imbs (1999 Imbs ( , 2004 , Clark and van Wincoop (2001) , Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001) , Gruben, Koo, and Millis (2002) , and Calderon, Chong, and Stein (2003 small after the 1970s, and Germany's decline may have occurred later than the others. 16 In contrast with the standard deviations, moving 5-year correlations show no clear change over the period (figure 5). Estimated correlations between G-7 economies fluctuate widely over the business cycle, tending to reach peaks after U.S. recessions. The moving correlations show no clear break in behavior within the English group (panel A), the euro group (panel B), or elsewhere (panel C). Japan is again an exception: the correlation of Japan with the rest of the G-7 has fallen sharply and turned negative in the 1990s. The high levels of correlation at the end of our sample are consistent with the historical pattern of high correlation following U.S. recessions. Figure 6 presents the moving correlations for consumption growth. Once again, no obvious changes are observed. With standard deviations falling and correlations either showing no clear change or falling, measured covariances must have fallen in the 1980s (figure 7).
Both the trade and financial integration measures show dramatic increases over the sample period. In contrast, our measures of correlations rise and fall roughly with the U.S. business cycle and show no clear pattern of increase. Without formal testing, however, we can conclude only that dramatic rises in certain integration measures have not led to similarly dramatic changes in measured correlation. The next section presents formal evidence on these questions.
IV. Formal Inference
In this section we present formal inferences about changes in the time series processes for GDP, consumption, and investment. We drop Japan from the analysis and study only the rest of the G-7 (G-7x). Though there are clearly breaks in the behavior of the Japanese aggregates and in their relation with the rest of the G-7, we believe that these are related to the special problems Japan has experienced. If dropping Japan biases our analysis, it biases it in favor of finding increased correlation.
We present no new evidence about whether there exist breaks in the processes we study; their existence has been well documented in earlier work. As we review below, a break in mean growth around 1970 and a break in the volatility of growth in the early 1980s are well established. Given the existence of breaks, many interesting hypotheses have been made regarding which features of the processes changed and which, if any, remained constant. If the variance of output growth fell, correlation or covariance must have changed.
Most papers addressing comovement have presented descriptive evidence like that in the previous section without 16 Our conclusions concerning Germany should be taken with caution because of the measurement issues surrounding German reunification. See appendix A for an explanation of how we treat German reunification. 
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formal inference. 17 In the most common approach, the papers first establish in some way that breaks have occurred. For example, they use appropriate techniques to establish and date the break in the variance of growth. Having chosen break dates, the papers go on to report subsample estimates of various statistics such as covariances or correlations. Differences in these point estimates are then interpreted as evidence of changes in those parameters. An alternative approach is to estimate a time-varying parameter model and simply report the estimates without any test of the null of no change in the relevant parameter. When we observe changes in parameter estimates it is always prudent to ask whether those differences are large relative to what we might expect to see if no change had occurred in the underlying parameter. In the next section, we show that bypassing inference may be especially risky in the current context.
A. Detecting Changes in Variance, Covariance, and Correlation
Inference about breaks in correlation and covariance is fundamentally less precise than inference regarding breaks in variance. For example, if the covariance of GDP growth between the United States and the United Kingdom remained constant as variance fell in the early 1980s, it is quite likely that the point estimates of covariance from the two subsamples would differ greatly. We illustrate the generic point with a simple example.
Suppose we have two samples, each drawn independently and identically from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0. We want to detect whether the variance-covariance matrices ⌺ i , i ϭ 1, 2, differ across the samples. Suppose in fact that ⌺ 2 ϭ ␣⌺ 1 where ␣ Ͻ 1, so that the variances and covariances fell proportionally while the correlation stayed fixed.
One way to see that we have more power to detect the change in variance than the change in covariance is to consider limiting cases. If the correlation between the series is 1, then testing for a change in covariance and in variance is the same (as the variance and covariance are exactly the same), and equal power is attained with the two tests. If the correlation is 0, then there is no change in covariance between the two samples and hence no change can be detected. By a simple continuity argument, as the correlation goes from 1 to 0 in this problem, the relative power to detect the covariance change versus the variance change also goes from 1 to 0.
For moderate levels of correlation, such as the average output correlation of 0.24 among G-7 GDP growth over our sample, the relative power of the covariance test may be quite small. For example, in the simple example considered here, with the correlation of 0.24 an approximate slope argument suggests that it would take approximately 5 times as many observations in the covariance test to attain power equal to that of the variance test (see appendix B). Some Monte Carlo evidence consistent with this point is provided below.
The bottom line is that strong statistical evidence of breaks in the variance of processes does not provide a sound basis for concluding that similarly large changes in the point estimates of covariance or correlation are also statistically significant.
B. Description of our Inference Procedure
We consider breaks in the processes for GDP, consumption, and investment separately. The data are stated as annualized quarterly growth rates in percent (400 times the logarithmic quarterly change). Details regarding the data, including the treatment of some outlier quarters and, in particular, German unification, are given in appendix A.
For concreteness, consider the GDP case. We assume that the time-series process for GDP growth of the G-7x can be adequately approximated by a vector autoregression with one lag and a constant, where all the parameters (constant, slope, and shock variance-covariance) are allowed to break at a fixed number of dates. Allowing B breaks at the dates ϭ { 1 , . . ., B }, the parameters are ϭ { 1 , . . . , Bϩ1 }, where i is all the parameters of the VAR process in the ith subsample.
The key unique assumption we make is that we know the number of breaks, but not their dates. If we know the number of breaks, Bai (2000) suggests estimating the parameters by maximizing the Gaussian pseudo-likelihood for and . 18 We estimate and by maximizing the likelihood over all unique partitions and parameters . 19 Bai (2000) shows that so long as the conditioning assumption is correct, the asymptotic distribution of is the same as if the break dates were known and imposed a priori. 20 In particular, is asymptotically normal, i is uncorrelated with j if i j, and the variance-covariance matrix of the elements of i is just as if we were estimating a single vector auto regression (VAR) for the relevant subsample.
We are assuming that some features of the VAR break and want to test that others remain constant. All the features in which we are interested-for example, unconditional 17 See footnote 6. 18 In practice we use the conditional likelihood, conditional on initial lags in the first segment. 19 We require that at least 20% of the sample lie between any two breaks or a break and an endpoint. 20 This point may seem to go against the intuition from the endogenous breakpoint literature. That literature is concerned with testing for the existence of a break. Searching over the timing of a potential break affects the asymptotic distribution of tests for the existence of that break. If the maintained hypothesis contains a fixed number of breaks, searching over dates does not affect the asymptotic distribution of parameter estimates in this case. The reason for this stems from the fact that the estimated break times (viewed as a share of the sample) converge more rapidly than the coefficient estimates. Note that the asymptotic theory involves the size of the change in the coefficients going to 0 (at the right rate) with the sample size. Despite the shrinking break, the break times converge rapidly.
variances and covariances-can be written as scalar functions of the VAR parameters, G(). We want to test
for various G. 21 Given that i and j are jointly asymptotically normal and the variance-covariance matrix can be consistently estimated, there are a multitude of asymptotically valid approaches to computing confidence intervals. A familiar approach is to form a confidence interval for ⌬ ij ϭ G( i ) Ϫ G( j ) as ⌬ ij plus and minus twice its asymptotic standard error, computed, say, using the delta method.
We have many reasons to suspect that standard approaches, including standard bootstrap methods, will perform poorly in the current context. Both conventional asymptotic and bootstrap approaches perform very badly for various types of inference concerning VARs (Sims & Zha, 1999; Kilian, 1998) . Further, some of the G()s we are interested in are correlations, and conventional approaches are known to perform extremely poorly in such cases (Hall, 1992) .
For these reasons, we compute confidence intervals using the iterated other percentile bootstrap, which has been shown (Hall, 1992) to have both good finite-sample and good asymptotic properties. As in other bootstrap procedures, one repeatedly draws artificial samples. The word iterated arises because for each main bootstrap draw, one runs an additional bootstrap that is used to refine properties of the main bootstrap (for details, see appendix C). In section V A we provide evidence that these good properties obtain in the current context. Several additional issues are worth noting. We consider separate systems for GDP, consumption, and investment. Parsimony issues would become quite complicated if we were to estimate a joint system for all of these. Furthermore, theory gives reasons why the nature of the changes might differ for different variables: economic integration might raise consumption correlation while decreasing investment correlation. Nonetheless, running separate systems may cause us to miss certain important interactions. Our parsimony argument might suggest considering even smaller sets of countries (say, country pairs). We have looked some at smaller country sets and found the results to be generally consistent with what we report, but further work on this topic might be warranted.
The procedures condition on breaks existing and investigate what, if anything, has remained constant across subsamples. The number of breaks chosen may be important. We perform the analysis for one, two, and three breaks, but we report full results only for the three-break case. 22 We focus on the three-break case for the following reasons. There is a huge literature on a break in mean growth around 1970. Perhaps the strongest case for this break is found in Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998) . McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and many others give a strong case for a break in the variability of output growth in the early 1980s. Finally, tests for break dates in bivariate systems that include either Canada or Germany tend to find dates in the early 1990s. The German results may stem from unification. 23 By allowing this third break, which the method picks to be around the time of unification, our results should be robust to problems stemming from unification. As we argue below, our central conclusions are robust to conditioning only on two breaks, which the method places at the beginning of the 1970s and of the 1980s, suggesting that treatment of the early 1990s is not of central importance.
Finally, the only type of parameter change we consider is a small number of discrete breaks. Others have found evidence for other types of time variation in parameters [such as Stock and Watson (forthcoming) and Luginbuhl and Koopman (2003) ]. We believe that the discrete-break framework remains an important baseline in this literature. This case still dominates discussion, and we believe our results shed useful light on earlier results in the area. Further work on both approaches is surely warranted.
C. Results for the Mean and Variance
We now summarize the results in mainly statistical terms; ultimately, we return to the economics of the issue as laid out above.
Point Estimates of the Breaks:
With three breaks, there are four subperiods. Our inference approach picks the break dates based on the data. Because we estimate different VARs for GDP, consumption, and investment, the chosen break dates differ slightly across the three systems (table 1) . It is perhaps somewhat reassuring that the estimated break dates are very similar across the three systems. It is also reassuring that the first two dates are very close to the dates documented in other papers on this topic-there is not as large a literature placing a third break. 24 1972Q2 1981Q1 1992Q2 Consumption 1969Q2 1981Q1 1993Q1 Investment 1974Q3 1983Q1 1993Q1 The four periods chosen correspond roughly to the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We will use these decade labels to describe the periods, but one should take care to remember that the actual break dates do not fall exactly on the decade boundaries. 25 Mean Growth: We begin with a summary of the statistical significance and direction of breaks in mean growth. Table 2 reports whether the confidence interval for the change in mean between any two periods covers 0. If the 95% confidence interval lies entirely below 0, the table has a bold "D" for down; if the 90% confidence interval (but not the 95) is entirely below 0, there is a (plain) "D"; otherwise, if the point estimate is below 0, there is a "d." For the analogous cases above 0, there is the appropriate "U," "U," or "u" entry for up. In all cases, we report the value in the later subsample minus the earlier, so "up" means the coefficient rose through time. The rows of the table labeled "All," "Eng," and "Eur" report the test for a change in the unweighted average value of the parameter across the economies in the group.
One notable feature of the results is that mean growth of GDP and consumption fell very generally between the 1960s and both the 1970s and 1980s. This result is no surprise-the 1960s were a period of unusually strong growth; the 1970s and 1980s were not as strong. Some idea of the economic magnitude of the changes can be gained by considering the point estimates of mean growth in the subperiods (table 3) .
A second important feature is the difference between the English and euro groups. There are no significant changes in mean growth in the English group between periods after the 1960s, and few for the individual countries in the group. In contrast there are many significant reductions through time in both GDP and consumption growth in the euro group.
Consumption growth fell significantly between every pair of periods except the 1980s to 1990s in the euro group.
In as much as our main concern is with second moments, it is worth noting that these changes in the mean could have important implications for any empirical work on second moments that does not allow for them. Allowing for, say, only one mean break over the period could lead to spurious results regarding the variance in euro-area countries.
Standard Deviations:
The tests for changes in unconditional standard deviations confirm the familiar results from the literature and the graphical evidence seen earlier (table 4, upper panel). The unconditional standard deviation of GDP and consumption growth perhaps grew from the 1960s to the 1970s, but generally fell between any other pairs of periods. In the point estimates, the standard deviation of growth of GDP fell on average by approximately one-half, and that of consumption fell by approximately one-third.
The results for investment follow a similar pattern, but are more mixed. Generally, investment growth is more volatile than consumption and GDP growth. Because this volatility reduces the power to detect any sort of change, we should expect to find fewer significant changes in investment throughout the results.
The conditional standard deviation followed about the same pattern as the unconditional standard deviation (table 4, lower panel). 26 As noted above, some theories of the source of the fall in variance are distinguished by whether the reduction falls across the spectrum or is focused, say, at business-cycle frequencies. We address this question by asking whether there have been any changes in the shares of variance attributable to cycles in three regions of the frequency domain: business-cycle frequencies (8 to 32 quarters) and 25 We do not mean to imply that nothing turns on whether we take the break dates to be exactly on decade changes or shifted as in our procedure. Some conclusions may be sensitive. Remember that the last three U.S. recessions happen to fall near decade changes, and shifting the break timing slightly can change which subsample certain recessions fall in. 26 The conditional standard deviation is the standard deviation of the one-step-ahead prediction error, or equivalently, the standard deviation of the VAR reduced-form error. Similarly, the conditional covariance and correlation refer to the relevant terms in the VAR error variancecovariance or correlation matrix. 
Notes: The table presents tests for changes in the mean between all pairs of the four subsamples defined by the three breaks. The subsamples correspond roughly to the decades (see table 1 ) and are labeled 6, 7, 8, 9, for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. Changes in the mean from an earlier to later period are denoted D, for down, or U, for up. Bold uppercase letters indicate a change that is significant at the 5% level; plain uppercase indicates significance at the 10% level; lowercase simply signifies the sign of the change in the point estimate. Eng denotes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States; Eur denotes France, Germany, and Italy.
higher and lower frequencies. Table 5 shows tests of whether the share of variance in each of the three frequency bins changed. Except for comparisons with the 1960s for the United Kingdom and Canada, we find very few significant entries. There is little evidence that the reduction in unconditional variance was focused on one frequency bin more than others. An analogous result has been documented before for the United States and other countries (Ahmed et al., 2004; Stock & Watson, forthcoming) .
D. Results for Comovement
For the correlation and covariance measures (tables 6 through 9), the all, English, and euro values represent the equal-weighted means of the off-diagonal elements of the relevant covariance or correlation matrices. The Englisheuro measure is the mean of the off-diagonal elements of the matrix corresponding to elements with one country in each subgroup.
From the group estimates for GDP, it appears that unconditional correlations have risen quite generally between the 1960s and any subsequent period. The result is similar, although somewhat less uniform and less strong, for consumption. After the 1960s, we find no significant changes in GDP correlations for the all, the English, or the euro groups, and the signs of the changes in the point estimates are mixed. The average correlation between the English and euro countries fell significantly between the 1970s and 1980s, but shows no significant change thereafter. The Unconditional statistically significant changes in consumption after the 1960s in the country pairs are about equally split between ups and downs and are not clearly differentiated by subgroup. This result casts some doubt on the claim that euro and English groups have emerged with each group having strong internal comovement but with low correlation between the groups. The one bit of statistically significant evidence in line with this view is that the English-euro correlation fell from the 1970s to the 1980s. The decline in the point estimate, however, is from 0.38 to 0.16, approximately the same in magnitude as the fall in correlation within the euro group itself, 0.50 to 0.39.
The U.S.-Canada correlation shows no significant change during the period in which the trade share was growing sharply. The point estimate of the change in GDP correlation was negative between the 1970s and 1980s and between the 1980s and 1990s.
The conditional correlations show somewhat more evidence for a fall in correlation between periods after the 1960s. Several of the bivariate correlations show significant declines in both GDP and consumption correlation. Inter- U.S. lo
Notes: Business cycle frequencies, denoted bc, are those with periods between 8 and 32 quarters; high frequencies (hi) are those with periods shorter than bc; low frequencies (lo), longer than bc. See also the notes to tables 1 and 2. All 
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estingly from the standpoint of consumption risk sharing, the point estimates of the average conditional correlation among all six nations fell from the 1970s to the 1980s and from the 1980s to the 1990s. These changes are not statistically significant, however. If we accept the strong evidence of declines in variance, we know that either correlation, covariance, or both changed. The statistical theory suggests, however, that the evidence on changes in comovement will be less strong than that on the variance break.
We have, however, somewhat more evidence of declines in covariance than of rises in correlation. By crude count considering GDP growth, there are 18 significant downs (table 8) after the 1960s in covariance, whereas there are no comparable significant ups in correlation (table 6) .
We emphasize that our failure to find the much-discussed rise in correlation is not simply a matter of statistical precision. That is, it is not the case that we find large rises in correlation in the point estimates but that the confidence intervals are too large to reject no change. Note that for a clear majority of entries for GDP and consumption in table 6 for periods after the 1960s, the point estimate suggests a fall in correlation. All All
Notes: For break dates see table 1. Also see notes to table 2.
E. Interpretation
We now consider what light these results shed on the discussion in section 2 of the economics of comovement. It seems clear that there has been a widespread decrease in output and consumption volatility over the sample period, but there has been no correspondingly clear change in comovement. These results are probably most easily reconciled with the view that common and idiosyncratic variation fell proportionally, leaving correlation more or less unchanged. The evidence regarding comovement, however, is not definitive.
We have very little evidence that the increase in trade has raised growth correlation-even in cases of dramatic increases in links, such as for Canada. Similarly, there is little evidence that the increase in linkages in the euro group has raised correlation. 27 The rise in trade and also financial links has not clearly led to the increase in consumption growth correlation that very simple models of international risk sharing predict. Finally, we cannot reject that the fall in variance is equally distributed across the spectrum. Thus, the data do not strongly support the view that the change has been primarily a disappearance of the business cycle due to policy or other reasons.
V. Robustness and Statistical Properties
In this section we present additional results bearing on the robustness of our main conclusions. We focus on the three results listed in the introduction: the 1960s were a period of low correlation, variance fell after 1970s, and except between the 1960s and 1970s, there is no significant evidence of a change in correlation.
A. Monte Carlo Evidence on Our Inference Procedure
To assess the finite-sample properties of our inference procedure we ran five Monte Carlo experiments using two different data-generation processes (DGPs). 28 Our main results are conditioned on the existence of three breaks, so both DGPs have three breaks. The sample size is 172, as in the empirical application, and the break dates are placed so that they are consistent with the three-break GDP case in table 1.
Our first DGP is designed to fit the GDP growth data as well as is possible while allowing for a few breaks in our parameters of central interest. In DGP 1, the first and third breaks are only in the means of all variables. At the second break, the shock standard deviations for the United States and United Kingdom are scaled by a factor of 0.55, roughly matching the data. The other parameters are scaled accordingly, so that all unconditional and conditional correlations remain unchanged; all unconditional and conditional covariances not involving the United States and United Kingdom also remain unchanged. In DGP 2, the first and third breaks involve only a change in mean as in DGP 1. At the second break, all six unconditional variances are scaled by 3/5, while all unconditional covariances remain unchanged. 29 Thus, all unconditional correlations rise by a factor of 5/3. 27 Our results for the euro area may be in conflict with the results of Artis et al. (1997) regarding the euro countries. They are addressing a related though different question, however, which is the association of binary variables indicating business cycle phase. Harding and Pagan (2001, 2003) have refined that approach and call into question the results on a strong euro cycle.
The first experiment explores the small-sample properties of our iterated other percentile bootstrap using DGP 1. We report coverage properties for the unconditional momentchange confidence intervals for the all, English, and euro groups. The top panel of table 10 shows how frequently our nominal 90% coverage intervals contain 0, indicating no change. For the unbracketed entries, the true value (the value in the DGP) is 0, so ideal coverage is 90%. For the bracketed entries, the DGP parameter changes and ideal coverage is 0.
All of the unbracketed entries are very close to 90, indicating that our procedure comes very close to the ideal coverage in the no-change case. The bracketed entries illustrate the relative difficulty in detecting standarddeviation versus comovement changes. In cases where there is a standard-deviation break (bracketed entries), the confidence intervals contain 0 less than 25% of the time. In contrast, in cases where the correlation broke, the confidence intervals contain 0 more than 85% of the time.
Panel 2 presents analogous information to panel 1, but in this case the confidence intervals are computed using the percentile-t bootstrap, which is probably the most widely advocated "conventional" bootstrap approach. As predicted by the literature, this approach performs rather badly. For the unbracketed entries, coverage varies from 71% to 96%, whereas the ideal is 90%. Further, some of the bracketed entries are greater than the corresponding entries in the top panel, indicating that the percentile-t confidence intervals are more likely to contain 0 than in our preferred approach when the parameter has in fact changed. A third Monte Carlo (not shown) suggests that our preferred approach performs quite comparably to a version of Kilian's biasadjusted bootstrap.
The fourth experiment looks at our preferred bootstrap using DGP 2. Panel 3 shows again that for parameters that do not change (unbracketed), the coverage for the procedure is close to the nominal 90% value. The bracketed values for standard deviation and correlation again show the relative difficulty of detecting the standard-deviation and correlation changes. The average bracketed value for the standard deviation is 26%; for correlation the value is 68%. Our chance of detecting a correlation change of this magnitude is somewhat worse than a coin toss. In our fifth experiment, we use DGP 2 again, but double the sample size. In this Notes: See notes to table 2 and Appendices C and D. For entries in square brackets, the population value is nonzero, so that the ideal coverage is zero. For other entries, ideal coverage is 90%. Bold entries indicate that the ideal coverage is 90%, but empirical coverage is not within (90 Ϯ 5)%. The DGPs are described in the text. The confidence intervals in the first and third panels are computed using an iterated other percentile bootstrap; those in the second panel are computed using a percentile-t bootstrap.
case, for the standard deviation the average bracketed value has dropped to 6%, and the corresponding value for correlation is 50%. Thus, detecting this sort of change in correlation would remain about a coin toss even with a doubled sample size.
Overall, we take these results as supporting the view that our confidence intervals will cover a true value of 0 at very close to the desired nominal rate. The results also illustrate the relative difficulty of detecting volatility versus comovement changes. The power to detect correlation changes is not great-as predicted by the theory-but neither is it negligible.
B. Results for Alternative Comovement Measures
We now turn to results for alternative comovement measures. Each of our three types of measures is a standard "atheoretical" way to summarize how similarly variables move together. These each measure a slightly different notion of comovement, and, in principle, the results could be different. 30 Our first measure, (N), is the sum of the largest N eigenvalues of any correlation matrix. This measure has a standard factor-theoretic or principal-components interpretation. We want to choose factors f t that are N ϫ 1, t ϭ 1, . . . , T, and that can be serially correlated. We choose these factors to maximize the sum of the R 2 s for regressions of the form
where k is the number of countries in the group. In this sense, these are the N Ͻ k factors that best explain our k variables. If we choose the factors in this way, then (N) is the sum of the R 2 s. If (N) increases, then the movements of our k variables can be better explained by our N Ͻ k factors.
The second measure is more dynamic and somewhat more familiar from identified VAR work. In any VAR system, once the shocks are orthogonalized, we can calculate the variance share of any variable that can be attributed to any shock. Following Faust (1998) , we can calculate the maximum variance share, summing shares across all variables, that could be attributed to any N orthogonalized shocks. This measure can also be seen as a sum of R 2 s. In particular, it maximizes the sum of R 2 s across the k regressions
where ␤ j (L) is a one-sided lag polynomial and f t is serially uncorrelated and lies in the space spanned by the shocks of the VAR.
Our third measure is a fully dynamic version of the first. In this case, we only consider a single factor for computational ease. This factor is designed to maximize the sum of R 2 s from the k regressions, 30 There are a great many other measures of comovement, which might give different results. We have tried a wide range of the most conventional ones. For recent work proposing alternatives, see Harding and Pagan (2001, 2003) and Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) . Brillinger (1981) discusses the calculation of this quantity. 31 The evidence for breaks in these measures (table 11) is consistent with the earlier evidence for correlations: there is some evidence of an increase in correlation from the 1960s to later periods and very little evidence of further change thereafter.
C. Alternative Versions of the Results
So far we have reported results for VARs with three breaks estimated on raw growth-rate data. These results are from just one of 12 versions of the system we ran. In particular, we consider conditioning on one, two, and three breaks, using per capita versions of all the variables, and using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered versions of the variables, in addition to the raw growth rates. We run all combinations of these options. Full results are available from the authors. 32 In summarizing the results, we focus on the three results given in the introduction.
The first point to note is that systems with two and three breaks give very much the same picture regarding the three conclusions. Given the nature of the conclusions, the onebreak systems essentially must give a different answer. For example, consider the one-break systems that choose the early 1970s break. These must average together the highervariance 1970s and the lower-variance period after that. Further, these systems cannot reflect the ongoing decline in mean growth in the euro group.
The per capita and HP-filtered versions of the variables generally lead to the same break dates listed in table 1. The tables for per capita growth rates are virtually identical to the results reported above-population moves slowly and does not affect the general conclusions about either variability or comovement. The tests on the HP-filtered data generally show even weaker evidence of changes in comovement after the 1960s.
VI. Conclusions
We find that the reduction in growth variation that has been widely documented for the United States seems to be present in almost all of the other G-7 countries. The exception is Japan, which in the 1990s is a counterexample to most macroeconomic generalities regarding the G-7.
We have no clear evidence that correlation has increased with the rising economic integration over the sample period. In general, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no change in correlation. This conclusion holds even for Canada and the United States, which have seen a substantial increase in trade, and for the included euro countries-Germany, France, and Italy. The result also holds for consumption growth rates, despite the thought that greater integration might lead to greater correlation reflecting consumption insurance.
This result contrasts with some earlier claims in the literature. For the most part those claims are supported with reference to a few examples of rises in the point estimates of correlation, with no attempt at inference about whether the changes are statistically significant. We provide a theorybased reason to doubt whether that approach is reliable.
We present point estimates of breaks for wide range of measures of comovement and document that there is no overall pattern of increase in measured comovement. More importantly, very few of the estimated changes (up or down) are statistically significant. Of course, failure to reject the no-change hypothesis is not proof of no change-both the theory and Monte Carlo evidence we provide suggest that our ability to detect changes that are present would not be great. For now we can only conclude that even in the face of dramatic rises in integration, point estimates of correlation have not generally risen and measured changes are not generally statistically significant. APPENDIX A
Data
We use quarterly real GDP, consumption, and investment data from the first quarter of 1960 until the last quarter of 2002. For each country we use official national series as reported by Haver Analytics from the starting point of the relevant series to the end of the sample. In cases where the current vintage of national accounts data 33 does not extend to 1960, we splice data from an older-vintage official series as specified below. To splice the data, we use the quarterly growth rates from the earlier data along with the first level in the recent data to construct a new level series extending back to 1960Q1.
We handle German reunification by taking the quarterly growth rates of West German GDP, investment, and consumption for the period up to and including the first quarter of 1991, the quarter of reunification; growth-rate data are for united Germany thereafter. To create a level series consistent with the units for united Germany, we use the splicing method described above.
A search for outliers in the growth-rate data reveals two quarters for France, 1968Q2 and 1968Q3 , where the GDP growth rate is more than six standard deviations from the mean. These quarters were associated with well-known strikes and general unrest in France. We replace the data for these quarters in GDP, consumption, and investment using a univariate EM algorithm-an AR(1) model is estimated for each series, and the EM algorithm is used to replace the data for relevant quarters.
There are some other quarters with GDP growth rates 3 to 4 standard deviations from the series-specific average, including 1973Q1, 1979Q2 (United Kingdom), 1974Q1, 1997Q2 (Japan) and 1970Q1 (Italy) . The 1970Q1 Italy outlier falls where we splice two series, but the large change is explained by a general strike in 1969Q4. See the OECD Economic Survey, July 1970, for details. the interval from the kth to the (1 Ϫ k)th percentile of the ⌬ (m) s. This confidence interval is known to have poor coverage properties, but these deficiencies relative to other methods can be fixed by iteration.
For the iterated OPB confidence interval, the nominal 90% confidence interval is the th to the (1 Ϫ )th percentile of the ⌬ (m) s, where is chosen based on an iterated, or nested, bootstrap. The additional round of bootstrapping is used to pick an adjusted nominal level that brings the coverage closer to the desired level of 90%.
To calculate , for each of the N 1 samples in the main bootstrap do the following. For concreteness we talk of the mth original sample. The parameter estimates in the mth sample are (m) ϭ ( 1 (m) , . . . , Bϩ1 (m) ), where B is the number of breaks. Draw N 2 samples from the distribution implied by the parameter (m) using the same parametric approach used in the main bootstrap. Calculate the parameter of interest, ⌬ (m,n) , n ϭ 1, . . . , N 2 . Based on N 2 values, we can calculate, for any k, the 100(1 Ϫ 2k)% OPB confidence interval for ⌬. We can record whether this interval covers the original value for ⌬ estimated on the actual data. To form a 90% iterated OPB confidence interval, we choose as the kth, such that the 100(1 Ϫ 2k)% OPB interval covers the sample estimate of ⌬ in 90% of the N 1 nested bootstraps.
What remains to be explained is how we draw the bootstrap samples in the main and nested bootstraps. We use a conventional parametric bootstrap. The parameter estimates from the sample data are , and we call the T ϫ 6 matrix of reduced form residuals Ê . The parametric bootstrap of a VAR with one lag and breaks at ϭ ( 1 , . . . , B ) is conditioned on the first observation in the full sample. Given this initial condition, one can recursively generate observations for the first subsample using 1 and drawing shocks by choosing rows randomly from the first 1 rows of Ê . We then generate data for subsequent subsamples recursively, using the relevant parameter j and drawing rows from the relevant range of rows of Ê . All of the bootstrap samples are drawn with break dates fixed at the values that maximize the likelihood as described in the text.
APPENDIX D Monte Carlo Details
We conduct five Monte Carlo experiments. Three involve DGP 1. They differ as to how the confidence intervals are constructed: the iterated OPB, the percentile-t, or the Kilian bias-adjusted bootstrap. In the percentile-t, we calculate the standard error in a nested bootstrap with 500 replications. In our version of Kilian's bias-adjusted bootstrap, we calculated a bias adjustment in a nested bootstrap (100 replications) on each main bootstrap iteration. Throughout we estimated our VAR parameters using the same method as we do for our iterated OPB, which keeps them in the stable region.
The two remaining experiments involve DGP 2, and both use the iterated OPB. The two versions differ only in sample size. In one case the sample size matches that in our application; in the other it is twice as large.
The Monte Carlo samples are drawn as described above for the bootstrap, except that the shocks are drawn from the Gaussian distribution, as opposed to resampling from residuals. The number of Monte Carlo replications in all cases is at least 500. From top to bottom, the three panels in table 10 are based on 1000, 874, and 1025 replications, respectively. The Kilian bootstrap and doubled-sample results are based on 500 and 687 replications, respectively. The standard-sample-size experiments each take approximately 6 days of machine time in Gauss on a Pentium 4, 2.53-gigahertz PC. Further details are available as noted in footnote 22.
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